Orig­i­nal source pub­li­ca­tion: Dhillon, G., R. Syed and F. de Sá-Soares (2017). Infor­ma­tion Secu­rity Con­cerns in IT Out­sourc­ing: Iden­ti­fy­ing (In)con­gru­ence between Clients and Ven­dors. Infor­ma­tion & Man­age­ment 54(4), 452–464.
The final pub­li­ca­tion is avail­able here.

Infor­ma­tion Secu­rity Con­cerns in IT Out­sourc­ing: Iden­ti­fy­ing (In)con­gru­ence between Clients and Ven­dors

Gur­preet Dhillon,a Romilla Syedb and Fil­ipe de Sá-Soaresc

a Vir­ginia Com­mon­wealth Uni­ver­sity, Rich­mond, VA, USA
b Uni­ver­sity of Mass­a­chu­setts, Boston, MA, USA
c Uni­ver­si­dade do Minho, Braga, Por­tu­gal

Abstract

Man­ag­ing infor­ma­tion secu­rity in Infor­ma­tion Tech­nol­ogy (IT) out­sourc­ing is impor­tant. We con­duct a Del­phi Study to iden­tify key infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns in IT out­sourc­ing. A fol­low-up qual­i­ta­tive study was also under­taken to under­stand (in)con­gru­ence between clients and ven­dors with respect to the top infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns. In a final syn­the­sis, our study found three cen­tral con­structs to ensure infor­ma­tion secu­rity in IT out­sourc­ing: 1) com­pe­tence of the ven­dor to ensure infor­ma­tion secu­rity; 2) com­pli­ance of the ven­dor with client require­ments and exter­nal reg­u­la­tions; and 3) trust that pro­pri­etary infor­ma­tion is not abused and that ade­quate con­trols are in place.

Key­words: Infor­ma­tion Secu­rity; Infor­ma­tion Tech­nol­ogy Out­sourc­ing; Con­gru­ence; Del­phi Study; Qual­i­ta­tive Inter­views

1. Introduction

Glob­al­iza­tion requires that orga­ni­za­tions tran­scend national bound­aries to col­lab­o­rate among dis­trib­uted teams. Such global col­lab­o­ra­tions have trans­formed orga­ni­za­tional struc­tures around vir­tual teams, off­shoring, out­sourc­ing, and open sourc­ing [Ager­falk and Fitzger­ald 2008]. How­ever, infor­ma­tion secu­rity is a sig­nif­i­cant stick­ing point in estab­lish­ing a rela­tion­ship between Infor­ma­tion Tech­nol­ogy (IT) out­sourc­ing ven­dors and clients. While sta­tis­tics related to out­sourc­ing risks and fail­ures abound, there has been a lim­ited empha­sis on under­stand­ing infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns in out­sourced projects from both client and ven­dor per­spec­tives (see [Gon­za­lez et al. 2006] and [Lac­ity et al. 2010]). We argue that infor­ma­tion secu­rity incon­gru­ence stems from the lack of fit between what IT out­sourc­ing ven­dors con­sider to be the key suc­cess fac­tors and what out­sourc­ing clients per­ceive to be crit­i­cal for the suc­cess of the rela­tion­ship. It is impor­tant to under­take such an inves­ti­ga­tion because of two pri­mary rea­sons: (1) There is a prob­lem with the appre­ci­a­tion of the con­text within which IT ven­dors and clients oper­ate. A major­ity of IT out­sourc­ing projects fail because of a lack of appre­ci­a­tion as to what mat­ters to the clients and the ven­dors [Barthelemy 2001; Kaiser and Hawk 2004]. (2) Lack of con­gru­ence often leads to bro­ken processes and mis­aligned pri­or­i­ties, which are a con­se­quence of an orga­ni­za­tion’s inabil­ity to man­age the IT ven­dor-client rela­tion­ship [Earl 1996]. We study the infor­ma­tion secu­rity incon­gru­ence prob­lem through the fol­low­ing research ques­tions:

  1. What are the key infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns that IT out­sourc­ing clients and ven­dors face?

  2. What is the extent of (in)con­gru­ence between IT out­sourc­ing clients and ven­dors with respect to the top ranked infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns?

There are two classes of def­i­n­i­tions that need clar­ity. First, in our research IT out­sourc­ing refers to the arrange­ment between a client and a ven­dor
firm where a ven­dor may pro­vide infor­ma­tion tech­nol­ogy related ser­vices to the client orga­ni­za­tion [Lac­ity and Will­cocks 1998]. Sec­ond, in our research infor­ma­tion secu­rity refers to the con­fi­den­tial­ity, integrity, and avail­abil­ity of infor­ma­tion or intel­lec­tual prop­erty per­tain­ing to client and ven­dor firms engaged in IT out­sourc­ing projects (see [Chowd­huri 2012] for a detailed review). In the con­text of this research, we are con­cerned with the nature and scope of infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns in ongo­ing IT out­sourc­ing arrange­ments between clients and ven­dors.

In this paper, we present an analy­sis of a two-phase study to inves­ti­gate the extent of (in)con­gru­ence between out­sourc­ing clients and ven­dors. In the first phase, we con­duct an exten­sive Del­phi Study to iden­tify major infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns in out­sourced projects. We rank the infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns to iden­tify the pri­or­i­ties of the clients and ven­dors for the con­cerns. In the sec­ond phase, we con­duct an inten­sive analy­sis of the con­cerns through in-depth inter­views with sev­eral client and ven­dor firms. Based on the analy­sis, we define a frame­work to ensure infor­ma­tion secu­rity in IT out­sourc­ing.

2. Informing Literature

In this research, we are informed by the main­stream IT out­sourc­ing lit­er­a­ture. Within this lit­er­a­ture, we are par­tic­u­larly inter­ested in research that has focused on iden­ti­fy­ing infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns. Such research falls into two broad cat­e­gories: research focus­ing on rela­tion­ships between clients and ven­dors and research focus­ing on out­sourc­ing risk assess­ment.

One of the ear­lier pieces of research by Michael Earl [1996] notes,the objec­tives of out­sourc­ing are cost cut­ting; a desire to focus on the busi­ness, not on IT.” Hence, a major­ity of the research since the mid-1990s focused on man­ag­ing con­trac­tual rela­tion­ships amongst clients and ven­dors and struc­tur­ing inter­nal ser­vice pro­vi­sion. Pub­lished lit­er­a­ture reviews are an evi­dence of such a focus (e.g., Gon­za­lez et al. [2006] and Lac­ity et al. [2010]). The lit­er­a­ture on cul­ti­vat­ing and sus­tain­ing rela­tion­ships between clients and ven­dors has iden­ti­fied sev­eral chal­lenges that hin­der an out­sourc­ing arrange­ment. Bach­lech­ner et al. [Bach­lech­ner et al. 2014] for instance iden­tify six chal­lenges-audit­ing clouds, man­ag­ing het­ero­gene­ity, coor­di­nat­ing stake­hold­ers, man­ag­ing rela­tion­ships, data migra­tion, and aware­ness. Based on the qual­i­ta­tive analy­sis of client and ven­dor rela­tion­ships, Bach­lech­ner et al. pro­pose sev­eral strate­gies to over­come the chal­lenges such as build­ing a good client-ven­dor rela­tion­ship, ensur­ing tech­ni­cal and method­olog­i­cal capa­bil­ity, build­ing con­fi­dence in the rela­tion­ship, and shar­ing tech­ni­cal infor­ma­tion about the client-ven­dor con­fig­u­ra­tion.

One of the lim­i­ta­tions of the Bach­lech­ner et al. [2014] study is the a pri­ori iden­ti­fi­ca­tion of the infor­ma­tion secu­rity chal­lenges. The chal­lenges are too spe­cific to ensure com­pli­ance with ser­vice level agree­ments. Liu et al. [2014] make some progress in this regard by devel­op­ing a ven­dor selec­tion method, which is based on secu­rity ser­vice level agree­ment. In a final syn­the­sis, the authors present an auto­mated algo­rithm for rank­ing trust lev­els. While this may be a very use­ful tool, prob­lems arise with the iden­ti­fi­ca­tion of secu­rity terms in ser­vice level agree­ments. In some cases, the prob­lem is the ser­vice level agree­ment itself. Clients and ven­dors inter­pret the con­trac­tual agree­ments dif­fer­ently and despite cor­rec­tive actions, fail to res­cue the out­sourc­ing arrange­ment (see [Moe et al. 2014]).

The exist­ing research on out­sourc­ing risk assess­ment notes sev­eral fac­tors that pose risks to IT out­sourc­ing arrange­ments. For exam­ple, Inter­net Secu­rity has been con­sid­ered as one of the tech­no­log­i­cal risks [Kern et al. 2002], with data con­fi­den­tial­ity, integrity, and avail­abil­ity as the top­most con­cerns in an out­sourc­ing arrange­ment [Khal­fan 2004]. Few sur­veys also report com­puter net­works, reg­u­la­tions, and per­son­nel as the high­est secu­rity threats to orga­ni­za­tions [Chang and Yeh 2006]. Other sur­veys rec­og­nize that not only tech­ni­cal but also non-tech­ni­cal threats can be detri­men­tal to an out­sourc­ing engage­ment [Chang and Yeh 2006; Dlamini et al. 2009; Pai and Basu 2007]. Some stud­ies note that the influ­ence of non-tech­ni­cal con­cerns such as employ­ees, reg­u­la­tions, and trust is more severe than tech­no­log­i­cal risks [Loch et al. 1992; Posthu­mus and von Solms 2004; Tickle 2002; Tran and Atkin­son 2002]. As such few stud­ies are con­cerned with a spe­cific type of secu­rity con­cern such as secu­rity poli­cies [Ful­ford and Doherty 2003]. Although these stud­ies increase our under­stand­ing of the poten­tial risks in IT out­sourc­ing, there is lim­ited focus on infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns from both client and ven­dor per­spec­tives [Earl 1996; Sak­thivel 2007].

Gon­za­lez et al. [2006] note that a major­ity of IT out­sourc­ing top­ics are researched from four per­spec­tives: clients, providers, rela­tion­ship, and eco­nomic the­o­ries. Their analy­sis sug­gests that the out­sourc­ing suc­cess fac­tors and risks have received atten­tion only from a client per­spec­tive. In another study, Lac­ity et al. [2010] iden­tify infor­ma­tion secu­rity as a com­mon IT out­sourc­ing risk, which could poten­tially be a cause of dis­cor­dance between clients and ven­dors. How­ever, the major­ity of other con­cerns deal with busi­ness risks that range from back­lash from inter­nal IT staff, breach of con­tract, lack of trust to issues of sup­plier power, turnover, and burnout.

Sev­eral researchers have also pro­posed frame­works to iden­tify orga­ni­za­tional assets at risk and finan­cial met­rics to deter­mine the pri­or­ity of assets that need pro­tec­tion [Bojanc and Jer­man-Blažic 2008; Osei-Bryson and Ngwenyama 2006], Like­wise, Doo­mum [2008] pre­sented a multi-layer secu­rity model to mit­i­gate the secu­rity risks, both at a tech­ni­cal and non­tech­ni­cal lev­els, in out­sourc­ing domains. Doo­mum’s frame­work arranges eleven steps in an out­sourc­ing arrange­ment across three lay­ers of secu­rity: iden­ti­fi­ca­tion; mon­i­tor­ing; and improve­ment and mea­sure­ment. Although the pro­posed frame­work can be use­ful to iden­tify, mon­i­tor, and eval­u­ate infor­ma­tion secu­rity risks in out­sourc­ing arrange­ments, it lacks empir­i­cal val­i­da­tion. Fur­ther­more, the frame­work is process-cen­tric, focus­ing on how to man­age infor­ma­tion secu­rity rather than what needs to be man­aged. Wei and Blake [2010] pro­vide a com­pre­hen­sive list of infor­ma­tion secu­rity risk fac­tors and cor­re­spond­ing safe­guards for IT off­shore out­sourc­ing. How­ever, the issues have mainly been bor­rowed from the exist­ing lit­er­a­ture and lack empir­i­cal valid­ity. More recently, Nas­sim­beni et al. [2012] pro­posed an assess­ment frame­work to iden­tify secu­rity risk pro­files of com­pa­nies involved in out­sourc­ing and off­shoring IT projects. Their frame­work offers insights to man­age intel­lec­tual prop­erty secu­rity risks in ser­vice out­sourc­ing. The authors argue that unlike pre­vi­ous stud­ies that focus on a sin­gle aspect of secu­rity, their frame­work pro­vides a holis­tic analy­sis of secu­rity at tech­ni­cal, legal, and man­age­r­ial lev­els. Although their frame­work could be very use­ful to under­stand secu­rity issues dur­ing dif­fer­ent phases of out­sourc­ing (e.g., strate­gic plan­ning, sup­plier selec­tion and con­tract­ing, and imple­men­ta­tion and mon­i­tor­ing), it suf­fers from the lack of under­stand­ing in the exist­ing lit­er­a­ture about the secu­rity aspects [Nas­sim­beni et al. 2012].

We con­clude that although there is a rich body of research on IT out­sourc­ing, the lit­er­a­ture has some defi­cien­cies. First, sev­eral stud­ies have high­lighted the impor­tance of client-ven­dor rela­tion­ship [Bach­lech­ner et al. 2014; Lac­ity et al. 2010], but not enough atten­tion has been paid to the lack of appre­ci­a­tion of infor­ma­tion secu­rity, which in turn could threaten the client-ven­dor rela­tion­ship. Sec­ond, the research related to risk analy­sis mainly focusses on con­cep­tual frame­works for man­ag­ing risk fac­tors and does not offer insights about the aspects of infor­ma­tion secu­rity that need to be man­aged. Fur­ther­more, few stud­ies con­sider infor­ma­tion secu­rity as one of the many types of risks in IT out­sourc­ing (e.g., Lac­ity et al. [2010]). Our study iden­ti­fies the infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns from both client and ven­dor per­spec­tives and empir­i­cally assesses the (in)con­gru­ence between clients and ven­dors.

3. Research Methodology

In this research, we used the Del­phi tech­nique to iden­tify impor­tant infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns per­ti­nent to an IT out­sourc­ing rela­tion­ship. We fol­lowed up by under­tak­ing in-depth qual­i­ta­tive inter­views with the sub­ject mat­ter experts to under­stand the dif­fer­ences in the rank­ings obtained from IT out­sourc­ing clients and ven­dors. The schematic illus­trat­ing the method­olog­i­cal steps in pre­sented in Fig­ure 1.

Figure 1

Fig­ure 1: Sequence of Method­olog­i­cal Steps

3.1 The Delphi Study

The objec­tive of this study is to develop a com­pre­hen­sive list of key infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns in IT out­sourc­ing and to under­stand the (in)con­gru­ence between clients and ven­dors for infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns in IT out­sourc­ing. One of the approaches to elicit data is to engage a panel of experts who have sig­nif­i­cant knowl­edge and expe­ri­ence in IT out­sourc­ing and infor­ma­tion secu­rity. The Del­phi method is a suit­able way to elicit the opin­ions of the pan­els of experts through iter­a­tive feed­back-based con­ver­gence and, iden­tify and rank the con­cerns in order of impor­tance. Del­phi tech­nique has some dis­tinct advan­tages over other rank­ing meth­ods. Okoli and Pawloski [2004] dis­cuss the strengths and weak­nesses of Del­phi method with respect to other rank­ing approaches. In this study, we applied the Del­phi method because of the fol­low­ing five rea­sons:

  1. Del­phi method allows to inquire and seek the diver­gent opin­ions and expe­ri­ences of dif­fer­ent experts and trans­late those into a reli­able and val­i­dated list of infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns for both client and ven­dor orga­ni­za­tions.

  2. We employed a rank­ing method based on Schmidt’s Del­phi method­ol­ogy to elicit opin­ions of pan­els of experts through con­trolled inquiry and feed­back [Schmidt 1997]. Del­phi study allowed infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns to con­verge to the ones that are impor­tant for clients and ven­dors in IT out­sourc­ing.

  3. Del­phi method is suit­able if the par­tic­i­pants are not co-located. The researchers col­lected data from global experts.

  4. The find­ings from Del­phi per­mit­ted us to con­duct the sec­ond phase of the research inquiry lead­ing to richer data col­lec­tion and under­stand­ing of infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns in IT out­sourc­ing.

  5. As pre­vi­ously stated, there is a lack of knowl­edge about infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns in IT out­sourc­ing and the impor­tance of the con­cerns for clients and ven­dors. The Del­phi method allowed us to under­stand the con­cerns from both client and ven­dor per­spec­tives.

To select the par­tic­i­pants, we started out by iden­ti­fy­ing exist­ing out­sourced arrange­ments between firms in the US and India. In our ini­tial screen­ing, we iden­ti­fied six com­pa­nies in the US (two major banks, two health­care com­pa­nies, a hotel con­glom­er­ate, and a retail com­pany), which had ongo­ing out­sourc­ing arrange­ments with Indian coun­ter­parts. Indian ven­dor firms were located in three major cities—Ban­ga­lore, Chandi­garh, and New Delhi. To account for the max­i­mum diver­sity regard­ing the roles and expe­ri­ences of glob­ally dis­trib­uted teams, we reached out to the senior exec­u­tives for iden­ti­fy­ing and nom­i­nat­ing sub­ject mat­ter experts. We dropped one of the dyadic arrange­ments because of the lack of par­tic­i­pa­tion by the nom­i­nated indi­vid­u­als. In the final count, we had 11 experts rep­re­sent­ing five firms in the US and five firms in India. The experts were divided into two pan­els—Out­sourc­ing Clients (5) and Out­sourc­ing Ven­dors (5). All experts had sub­stan­tial expe­ri­ence in cross-bor­der col­lab­o­ra­tions as well as in infor­ma­tion secu­rity. The pro­file of our pan­elists is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Pro­file of Del­phi Study Pan­elists

Table 1

Our sam­ple size con­forms to the sug­ges­tions made by other schol­ars. For exam­ple, Schmidt [1997] sug­gests lim­it­ing the num­ber of par­tic­i­pants between 9 and 12 so as to pre­vent them from being intim­i­dated with the feed­back gen­er­ated dur­ing rank­ing rounds. Like­wise, Okoli and Pawlowski [2004 rec­om­mend a group size of 10 to 11 as the results are depen­dent on group dynam­ics rather than group size. Fur­ther­more, the experts in this study rep­re­sented mul­ti­ple indus­tries that allowed us to focus on the generic infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns in IT out­sourc­ing rather than the con­cerns spe­cific to a par­tic­u­lar indus­try.

Based on Schmidt’s approach, data was col­lected in three rounds [Schmidt 1997]. In the first round, known as brain­storm­ing or blank sheet round, the experts were asked to list at least six secu­rity con­cerns inher­ent to out­sourced col­lab­o­ra­tions along with a short descrip­tion of each con­cern. The authors col­lated the con­cerns by remov­ing dupli­cates. The com­bined list was sent to the experts explain­ing why cer­tain items were removed and fur­ther asked the experts for their opin­ion on the integrity and uni­for­mity of the list. In the sec­ond round, we asked each expert to pare down the list to the most impor­tant con­cerns. The refined list was shared with the experts; rea­sons for merg­ing or delet­ing a con­cern were pro­vided. The authors sought a con­sen­sus on the final list of con­cerns so that a com­mon agreed upon set of con­cerns are ranked in the sub­se­quent rounds. In each round, the authors reduced the num­ber of con­cerns to ones that were highly ranked for main­tain­ing qual­ity and pre­vent­ing par­tic­i­pant fatigue (see [Judd 1972] and [Schmidt et al. 2001]). Informed by Schmidt et al. [2001], experts were asked to choose at least ten con­cerns that they con­sid­ered impor­tant in out­sourced col­lab­o­ra­tions. The con­cerns that were cho­sen as impor­tant by more than half of the experts, i.e. con­cerns with a mode of > = 5 were retained, reduc­ing the total num­ber of con­cerns to 26. Rank­ing of the final 26 con­cerns was done in phase 3. The experts were divided into two pan­els: client and ven­dor. Dur­ing this phase, each expert was required to rank the con­cerns in order of impor­tance with 1 being the most impor­tant infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cern and 26 being the least impor­tant infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns in IT out­sourc­ing. The pan­elists were restricted to have ties between two or more con­cerns.

The rank­ing of con­cerns involved mul­ti­ple iter­a­tions until con­sen­sus among the experts within each panel was achieved. To avoid bias, a ran­domly ordered set of con­cerns was sent to each pan­elist in the first rank­ing round. For the sub­se­quent rounds, the lists were ordered by aver­age ranks. We used Kendall’s Coef­fi­cient of Con­cor­dance W to mea­sure con­sen­sus level among the experts. Accord­ing to Schmidt [1997],W’ can range between 0.1 (very weak agree­ment) and 0.9 (unusu­ally strong agree­ment). We also used Spear­man’s Rank Cor­re­la­tion Coef­fi­cient Rho to mea­sure sta­bil­ity between two suc­ces­sive rank­ing rounds and between two pan­els in a given round. Rho can range between -1 (per­fect neg­a­tive cor­re­la­tion) and +1 (per­fect pos­i­tive cor­re­la­tion). The cri­te­ria for con­duct­ing sub­se­quent rank­ing rounds depends on W and Rho; rank­ing rounds were stopped either if Kendall’s Coef­fi­cient of Con­cor­dance W indi­cated a strong con­sen­sus ( >0.7) or if the level of con­sen­sus lev­eled off in two suc­ces­sive rounds. At the end of each rank­ing round, the experts were pro­vided the revised list of con­cerns ordered by ranks, mean rank for each con­cern, Kendall’s W, Spear­man’s Rho, p-value, and rel­e­vant com­ments by the experts, if any.

3.2 Qualitative Interviews

The sec­ond round of data col­lec­tion was based on sev­eral qual­i­ta­tive inter­views with rep­re­sen­ta­tives from For­tune 500 com­pa­nies. These indi­vid­u­als were dif­fer­ent from those in the Del­phi study. A con­ve­nience sam­ple of over two dozen com­pa­nies, which had a rela­tion­ship with the busi­ness school of one of the authors, was drawn. All indi­vid­u­als rep­re­sented major cor­po­ra­tions, which had ongo­ing out­sourc­ing rela­tion­ships with inter­na­tional ven­dors. To ensure that our inter­vie­wees had famil­iar­ity with infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns, we used two screen­ing ques­tions to nar­row down the list of par­tic­i­pants. These ques­tions were: Have you ever been involved with an IT out­sourc­ing project? Have you ever had to take deci­sions about pro­tec­tion of sen­si­tive infor­ma­tion in an IT out­sourc­ing project? Fif­teen of the twenty-four short­listed indi­vid­u­als met the cri­te­ria. Finally, eleven agreed to par­tic­i­pate in the study. The eleven par­tic­i­pants had an aver­age expe­ri­ence of about eight years and rep­re­sented bank­ing, insur­ance, health­care, man­u­fac­tur­ing, and con­sult­ing sec­tors. Five of the eleven worked for US based IT ven­dor firms. Table 2 sum­ma­rizes the pro­file of the inter­vie­wees.

Table 2: Pro­file of Qual­i­ta­tive Inter­view Par­tic­i­pants

Table 2

Each par­tic­i­pant was required to answer three ques­tions for all 26 con­cerns: (1) What do you think about the con­cern? (2) Why do you think it is impor­tant for an out­sourc­ing provider? (3) Why do you think it is impor­tant for the out­sourc­ing client? Suit­able probes were added fol­low­ing each ques­tion. This helped in devel­op­ing a rich insight. Our inter­views also focused on under­stand­ing the lack of con­gru­ence between out­sourc­ing clients and out­sourc­ing ven­dor with respect to the infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns. We shared the ranks obtained from the Del­phi study with our par­tic­i­pants. Two ques­tions, with suit­able probes, were asked to elicit their opin­ions on the gaps between the client and ven­dor rank­ings of the infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns: (1) What are the pos­si­ble rea­sons for assign­ing dif­fer­ent ranks to the infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cern in IT out­sourc­ing arrange­ments between clients and ven­dors? (2) What steps can be taken to resolve the dif­fer­ences in clients and ven­dors rank­ing of the infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns? The find­ings are dis­cussed in the next sec­tion.

4. Ranking of Information Security Concerns in IT Outsourcing

In this sec­tion, we present the results of Del­phi study in two sub­sec­tions. The first sub­sec­tion presents the full list of the infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns in IT out­sourc­ing iden­ti­fied by both clients and ven­dors. The sec­ond sub­sec­tion presents rank­ings of the infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns pro­vided by clients and ven­dors pan­els.

4.1 Identification of Information Security Concerns

The first objec­tive of this study is to develop a com­pre­hen­sive list of key infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns encom­pass­ing both clients and ven­dor per­spec­tives. Our research found twenty-six con­cerns related to infor­ma­tion secu­rity in IT out­sourc­ing rela­tion­ships. A brief dis­cus­sion of these con­cerns fol­lows in no spe­cific order. We also dis­cuss each con­cern in rela­tion to the exist­ing research.

Con­cern C1: Abil­ity of out­sourc­ing ven­dor to com­ply with client’s secu­rity poli­cies, stan­dards, and processes. An orga­ni­za­tion that wishes to out­source IT oper­a­tions needs to view its secu­rity poli­cies, stan­dards, and processes being largely applied by the ven­dor, with some minor adap­ta­tions as needed. A large body of lit­er­a­ture about employee com­pli­ance with infor­ma­tion secu­rity poli­cies have emerged over the years. Our research relates to the lit­er­a­ture of employee aware­ness and inten­tions to com­ply [Bul­gurcu et al. 2010; Herath and Rao 2009].

Con­cern C2: Audit of out­sourced infor­ma­tion tech­nol­ogy oper­a­tions. The out­sourc­ing clients expect to have access to a clear audit trail of impor­tant and sen­si­tive events and activ­i­ties. Research shows that audit is one of the use­ful means for pro­vid­ing infor­ma­tion about the occur­rence of an unde­sir­able event [Aubert et al. 2005].

Con­cern C3: Audit of out­sourc­ing ven­dor’s staffing process. The out­sourc­ing clients should be able to audit the staffing process of the out­sourc­ing ven­dors. Our par­tic­i­pants expressed con­cern that ven­dors could recruit good IT staff in the ini­tial days of the con­tract but over a period loosen the qual­ity of staff, over which clients do not have much con­trol. In their study, Kern and Will­cocks [Kern and Will­cocks 2002] report that third-party audits dis­cov­ered that ven­dors deliver the ser­vices as per the agree­ment, how­ever, anom­alies existed at mul­ti­ple lev­els, includ­ing qual­ity of staff.

Con­cern C4: Clar­ity of data stew­ard­ship. When a client orga­ni­za­tion out­sources IT oper­a­tions, the clients assume that they are out­sourc­ing their respon­si­bil­ity ofstew­ards of cus­tomer data’. There is a lack of under­stand­ing about respon­si­bil­i­ties of the data stew­ard­ship role among clients and ven­dors, which has con­se­quences for man­ag­ing infor­ma­tion secu­rity. Pre­vi­ous research notes that data stew­ards should be account­able for pro­tect­ing infor­ma­tion. For exam­ple, Spears and Barki [2010] refer to data stew­ard­ship as a for­mally assigned respon­si­bil­ity and orga­ni­za­tional expec­ta­tion that a data stew­ard will be informed of and adhere to secu­rity pol­icy.

Con­cern C5: Com­pre­hen­sive­ness of infor­ma­tion tech­nol­ogy out­sourc­ing deci­sion analy­sis. When an orga­ni­za­tion con­sid­ers out­sourc­ing IT oper­a­tions, it needs to con­sider sev­eral fac­tors, espe­cially the abil­ity of the ven­dors to secure sen­si­tive data. Our experts note that, often, in com­par­i­son to the per­ceived ben­e­fit of cost reduc­tion, the out­sourc­ing ven­dor’s abil­ity to secure cus­tomer data is assigned low weight. In the exist­ing research,Infor­ma­tion secu­rity’ is reported as the third impor­tant deter­min­ing fac­tor to out­source, fol­low­ingfocus on core com­pe­tence’ andven­dor’s ser­vice qual­ity’ [Yang et al. 2007]. Fur­ther­more, Khal­fan [2004] notes that infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cern is the most promi­nent risk fac­tor in out­sourc­ing and pro­vides a list of the causes of the con­cern, which could be the deter­mi­nants of out­sourc­ing deci­sion.

Con­cern C6: Con­gru­ence between out­sourc­ing ven­dor’s and client’s cul­tures. It refers to the cul­tural dif­fer­ences or sim­i­lar­i­ties between the out­sourc­ing ven­dors and clients in how the secu­rity poli­cies and stan­dards are embed­ded and enacted. Da Veiga and Eloff [2010] note that an infor­ma­tion secu­rity-aware cul­ture min­i­mizes the risk of employee mis­be­hav­ior and harm­ful inter­ac­tion with infor­ma­tion assets.

Con­cern C7: Dif­fi­culty of mon­i­tor­ing con­flict of inter­ests. It may be hard to mon­i­tor out­sourc­ing ven­dor’s activ­i­ties for con­flicts of inter­est among dif­fer­ent clients. Grant­ing advan­tages to other out­sourc­ing clients by an out­sourc­ing ven­dor can cause infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns to the client. Although IT out­sourc­ing is often described as astrate­gic alliance”, the out­sourc­ing clients and ven­dors can have poten­tially con­flict­ing inter­ests [Vin­ing 2999]. Lac­ity and Hirschheim [1993] note that the IT out­sourc­ing con­tract should state the process of con­flict res­o­lu­tion and prob­lem solu­tion.

Con­cern C8: Dis­si­pa­tion of out­sourc­ing ven­dor’s knowl­edge. An out­sourc­ing ven­dor that has high staff rota­tion may expe­ri­ence a higher risk of knowl­edge dis­si­pa­tion, thus affect­ing the qual­ity of the infor­ma­tion secu­rity ser­vices pro­vided to the client. Inkpen and Crossan [1995] regard the exchange of knowl­edge between strate­gic part­ners impor­tant for orga­ni­za­tional learn­ing, the absence of which could cause even­tual knowl­edge dis­si­pa­tion.

Con­cern C9: Diver­sity of juris­dic­tions and laws. If the out­sourc­ing ven­dor oper­ates in a con­text with dif­fer­ent inter­na­tional laws and juris­dic­tions, this may raise infor­ma­tion secu­rity issues, such as the impos­si­bil­ity to release data to for­eign work­ers employed by the ven­dor. Pre­vi­ous research reports sim­i­lar con­cerns in IT out­sourc­ing caus­ing vio­la­tions of con­for­mance and con­trac­tual require­ments [Pai and Basu 2007].

Con­cern C10: Fail­ure of an out­sourc­ing ven­dor to have in-depth knowl­edge of client’s busi­ness processes. The out­sourc­ing ven­dor may fail to acquire in-depth knowl­edge of the client’s busi­ness processes and sys­tems, which could pre­vent the ven­dors to pro­vide inno­v­a­tive infor­ma­tion secu­rity solu­tions. The need and mech­a­nisms to sup­port the effec­tive knowl­edge trans­fer from clients at onshore loca­tions to ven­dors at off­shore loca­tions are high­lighted in the exist­ing research (e.g. [Williams 2011]).

Con­cern C11: Finan­cial via­bil­ity of infor­ma­tion tech­nol­ogy out­sourc­ing. Expos­ing intel­lec­tual prop­erty and com­pany reserved data to any third party leads to an extra cost of intro­duc­ing addi­tional secu­rity mea­sures that can make IT out­sourc­ing finan­cially unvi­able. Schol­ars argue that before estab­lish­ing IT out­sourc­ing rela­tion­ship, the clients and ven­dors should ensure the long-term finan­cial and man­age­r­ial via­bil­ity, the absence of which could abruptly exit the rela­tion­ship [Miranda and Kavan 2005].

Con­cern C12: Gov­er­nance ethics of out­sourc­ing ven­dor’s con­text. Our client pan­elists were con­cerned if the out­sourc­ing ven­dors oper­ate in a con­text of trust, pro­bity, and free from cor­rup­tion. Meng et al. [2007] argue that effec­tive ser­vice gov­er­nance for both ser­vice out­sourcers and ser­vice providers deter­mine the suc­cess of IT out­sourc­ing.

Con­cern C13: Inabil­ity to change infor­ma­tion secu­rity require­ments. Once IT ser­vices have been handed over to an out­sourc­ing ven­dor, the out­sourc­ing client may be unable to change infor­ma­tion secu­rity require­ments. Since the ven­dor may request project exten­sions, bill addi­tional hours or out rightly reject the required changes, the out­sourc­ing con­tract may get rene­go­ti­ated. How­ever, exist­ing research acknowl­edges the need and chal­lenges to elicit and inte­grate chang­ing secu­rity require­ments [Khal­fan 2004]. Frame­works for secu­rity require­ments engi­neer­ing have also been sug­gested [Hal­ley et al. 2008].

Con­cern C14: Inabil­ity to har­ness busi­ness knowl­edge on sub­se­quent projects. Since the out­sourc­ing client has no con­trol of spe­cific out­sourced orga­ni­za­tional resources, it is dif­fi­cult to apply busi­ness knowl­edge and lessons learned on sub­se­quent projects, which are then com­pleted purely on a task to task basis with­out guar­an­tee of qual­ity and stan­dards com­pli­ance. Exist­ing lit­er­a­ture notes that both clients and ven­dors need to under­stand the impor­tance of knowl­edge man­age­ment, impli­ca­tions of the loss of knowl­edge, and the struc­tural require­ments to main­tain knowl­edge [Will­cocks et al. 2004].

Con­cern C15: Inabil­ity to rede­velop com­pe­ten­cies on infor­ma­tion secu­rity. Once an orga­ni­za­tion has out­sourced IT, it will be dif­fi­cult for the orga­ni­za­tion to develop com­pe­ten­cies to insource infor­ma­tion secu­rity in its IT sys­tems. In one of the ear­lier research, Aubert et al. [1998] note the unde­sir­able con­se­quences of IT out­sourc­ing. They argue that loss of orga­ni­za­tional com­pe­ten­cies involves loss of IT exper­tise, loss of inno­v­a­tive capac­ity, loss of con­trol of the activ­ity, and loss of com­pet­i­tive advan­tage.

Con­cern C16: Infor­ma­tion secu­rity com­pe­tency of the out­sourc­ing ven­dor. When an orga­ni­za­tion looks to out­source IT, it should check the skills pos­sessed by the out­sourc­ing ven­dor in infor­ma­tion secu­rity. The ven­dor should have a proven dis­ci­plined approach to secu­rity, includ­ing processes to iden­tify and con­trol secu­rity risks, poli­cies and tech­no­log­i­cal mech­a­nisms to pro­tect data, appli­ca­tion of infor­ma­tion secu­rity best prac­tices, etc. Sev­eral schol­ars note that the ven­dor com­pe­tence, in gen­eral, is impor­tant for out­sourc­ing suc­cess [Will­cocks et al. 2000], and the ven­dor com­pe­tence to secure a client’s intel­lec­tual and infor­ma­tional assets is regarded as one of the deci­sion fac­tors to out­source [Yang et al. 2007].

Con­cern C17: Infor­ma­tion secu­rity cred­i­bil­ity of out­sourc­ing ven­dor. As out­sourc­ing ven­dor should be able to pro­vide evi­dence, track record, exter­nal audit reports or cer­ti­fi­ca­tions against stan­dards in build­ing and oper­at­ing devel­op­ment and data pro­cess­ing events that have suf­fi­cient high-qual­ity secu­rity con­trols. Infor­ma­tion secu­rity man­age­ment guide­lines are used by orga­ni­za­tions to demon­strate their com­mit­ment to secu­rity, apply for cer­ti­fi­ca­tion, accred­i­ta­tion, or a secu­rity-matu­rity clas­si­fi­ca­tion [Sipo­nen and Willi­son 2009]. How­ever, much of the guide­lines are generic and do not account for dif­fer­ences between orga­ni­za­tions and the vary­ing secu­rity require­ments.

Con­cern C18: Legal and judi­cial frame­work of out­sourc­ing ven­dor’s envi­ron­ment. This con­cern means that if the out­sourcer oper­ates in an envi­ron­ment with a sound frame­work of law and jus­tice, which may be able to ensure proper enforce­ment of con­tract clauses regard­ing issues like data con­fi­den­tial­ity. In the lit­er­a­ture, sev­eral calls have been made that sug­gest clar­ity of legal and reg­u­la­tory frame­works (e.g. [Raghu 2009]).

Con­cern C19: Legal and reg­u­la­tory com­pli­ance. An out­sourc­ing client who is reg­u­lated on infor­ma­tion secu­rity and pri­vacy (e.g., HIPAA for Health­care, PCI for Mer­chants, etc.) must be able to ver­ify that the out­sourc­ing ven­dor can ade­quately meet and sus­tain those com­pli­ance needs. Dhillon et al. [2016] note that sim­i­lar con­cerns emerge dur­ing orga­ni­za­tional merg­ers. The incom­pat­i­bil­ity in the legal frame­work is reported to impact suc­cess­ful orga­ni­za­tional trans­for­ma­tion.

Con­cern C20: Qual­ity of out­sourc­ing ven­dor’s staff. This con­cern relates to the sound­ness of out­sourc­ing ven­dor’s staffing processes regard­ing vet­ting, train­ing, and mon­i­tor­ing of employ­ees. Lac­ity and Hirschheim [1993] note sev­eral rea­sons for dimin­ish­ing staff qual­ity of ven­dors. In par­tic­u­lar, the authors note that the ven­dors reduce the staff and make the remain­ing staff work extra hours, which makes peo­ple tired and prone to mak­ing mis­takes. More­over, ven­dors siphon their best employ­ees to secure new con­tracts, which dimin­ishes the over­all staff qual­ity.

Con­cern C21: Right bal­ance of access. The out­sourc­ing client needs to pro­vide the right bal­ance of access to the out­sourc­ing ven­dor so that they can under­take their job. In the lit­er­a­ture sev­eral tech­niques to pro­vide ade­quate access to resources in out­sourced IT projects have been pro­posed (e.g. [Hur and Noh 2011; Wang et al. 2009]).

Con­cern C22: Tech­ni­cal com­plex­ity of out­sourc­ing client’s infor­ma­tion tech­nol­ogy oper­a­tions. It may be dif­fi­cult to under­stand the out­sourc­ing client’s IT sys­tems, processes, and ser­vices by the out­sourc­ing ven­dor to the level nec­es­sary for iden­ti­fy­ing secu­rity vul­ner­a­bil­i­ties and breaches. Quélin and Duhamel [2003] argue that IT out­sourc­ing oper­a­tions are becom­ing increas­ingly com­plex as com­pa­nies are increas­ingly out­sourc­ing more mis­sion-crit­i­cal and com­plex oper­a­tions. The com­plex­ity of the client’s busi­ness and sys­tems poses severe chal­lenges to the ven­dors.

Con­cern C23: Tech­no­log­i­cal matu­rity of out­sourc­ing ven­dor’s envi­ron­ment. The out­sourc­ing clients are con­cerned if the out­sourc­ing ven­dor oper­ates in an envi­ron­ment that is tech­no­log­i­cally mature and con­fi­dent. Will­cocks and Kern [1998] sug­gest that the tech­ni­cal capa­bil­ity of ven­dors shape both struc­ture of out­sourc­ing con­tract and inter­per­sonal rela­tion­ship between clients and ven­dors.

Con­cern C24: Trans­parency of out­sourc­ing ven­dor billing. The out­sourc­ing ven­dor may uti­lize the resources of a par­tic­u­lar client to the ben­e­fit of other clients, and the client is not guar­an­teed that the resources billed by the ven­dor are indeed used for their orga­ni­za­tion only. In their study, Lac­ity and Hirschheim [1993] note the ser­vice prob­lems in out­sourc­ing. Among many, authors note that ven­dors charge for low-qual­ity resources same as that of high­qual­ity ones, bill non-pro­duc­tive hours such as group ven­dor meet­ings and train­ing, and charge by hours rather than pro­duc­tiv­ity.

Con­cern C25: Trust that out­sourc­ing ven­dor applies appro­pri­ate secu­rity con­trols. The out­sourc­ing clients trust that out­sourc­ing ven­dors apply appro­pri­ate secu­rity con­trols to pro­tect the data con­fi­den­tial­ity, integrity, and avail­abil­ity. Exist­ing research show that trust, in gen­eral, is a con­cern in IT out­sourc­ing [Loch et al. 1992; Posthu­mus and von Solms [2004; Tickle 2002; Tran and Atkin­son 2002], and a few stud­ies indi­cate a lack of secu­rity in IT out­sourc­ing as con­cern­ing [Ful­ford and Doherty 2003].

Con­cern C26: Trust that out­sourc­ing ven­dor will not abuse client’s pro­pri­etary infor­ma­tion and knowl­edge. The out­sourc­ing clients trust that the out­sourc­ing ven­dor will not abuse the pro­pri­etary knowl­edge exchanged as well as any other reserved infor­ma­tion released required for out­sourc­ing IT. In the lit­er­a­ture, shar­ing pro­pri­etary infor­ma­tion is reported to pos­i­tively influ­ence trust and com­mit­ment of ven­dors and clients [Lee 2001].

4.2 Ranking of Information Security Concerns

In this sec­tion, we present the analy­sis of the rel­a­tive ranks pro­vided by the two pan­els. The ranks of the con­cerns pro­vided by clients and ven­dors pan­els that evolved in three rank­ing rounds are listed in the Appen­dix A. By the third rank­ing round, clients’ panel had a fair agree­ment whereas ven­dors’ panel had a very weak agree­ment. The weak con­sen­sus among ven­dors indi­cates that not all ven­dors per­ceive the impor­tance of secu­rity at the same level. More­over, the two pan­els have a weak pos­i­tive cor­re­la­tion by round 3 (see Table 3), which sug­gests incon­gru­ence between the out­sourc­ing clients and out­sourc­ing ven­dors. Finally, the dif­fer­ence between the ranks assigned to each con­cern by the clients and ven­dors fur­ther high­lights the incon­gru­ence between the two. Table 4 presents a com­par­i­son of the ranks from client and ven­dor per­spec­tives and shows a sig­nif­i­cant divide between the two groups. Although the con­cerns are sorted com­pos­itely, the large dif­fer­ences between the client and ven­dor ranks for most of the con­cerns makes the com­pos­ite rank less rel­e­vant.

Table 3: Client and Ven­dor Con­sen­sus

Table

Table 4: Final Client and Ven­dor Ranks

Table 4

5. Discussion

In this sec­tion, we dis­cuss the find­ings per­tain­ing to the two research ques­tions of this study.

5.1 Research Question 1—What are the key information security concerns that IT outsourcing clients and vendors face?

In this sec­tion, we dis­cuss the top three infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns iden­ti­fied by the clients and ven­dors. In the lit­er­a­ture, a sim­i­lar approach dis­cussing top three con­cerns is also adopted by Liu et al. [2010]. We sup­ple­ment the dis­cus­sion with find­ings from indepth inter­views with a panel of experts.

5.1.1 Top Three Concerns from a Client Perspective

Client Con­cern 1: Trust that out­sourc­ing ven­dor applies appro­pri­ate secu­rity con­trols (C25). In an early paper on the role of trust in out­sourc­ing rela­tion­ships, Sab­her­wal [1999] quotes Kather­ine Hud­son of Kodak, who said,You can’t write a con­tract on spirit and cul­ture.” When deal­ing with secu­rity con­trols, this sen­ti­ment is per­va­sive as well. Clients typ­i­cally have a lack of trust that the ven­dor will apply appro­pri­ate secu­rity con­trols. And hence, may not be com­pli­ant with the preva­lent laws and reg­u­la­tions. Our dis­cus­sions with a CIO of a major bank in the US, which has out­sourced sig­nif­i­cant amount of IT ser­vices to India, notes:

I can say with absolute cer­tainty that our out­sourc­ing expe­ri­ence has been very pos­i­tive. We found sig­nif­i­cantly high level of com­pe­tence in our ven­dors. How­ever, there are con­stant chal­lenges of deal­ing with the reg­u­la­tory envi­ron­ment. Laws in the US are rather strict regard­ing dis­clo­sure and we feel that to be an imped­i­ment to get­ting our work done.

The CIO went on to note:

One of the press­ing issues in any out­sourc­ing rela­tion­ship is that of trust, yet trust needs to be ver­i­fied. Given the highly reg­u­lated envi­ron­ment in which we func­tion, it is impor­tant for ven­dors to apply appro­pri­ate [secu­rity] con­trols. But, we are never sure.

The lit­er­a­ture has reported sim­i­lar con­cerns, albeit on main­stream out­sourc­ing issues rather than secu­rity. It has been argued that there are issues of con­for­mance and con­trac­tual vio­la­tions, which can have a detri­men­tal impact on out­sourc­ing rela­tion­ships [Pai and Basu 2007]. Sab­her­wal [1999] also dis­cusses the vir­tu­ous cycle of the struc­ture, trust, and per­for­mance. He argues that dis­trust leads to poor qual­ity.

Client Con­cern 2: Abil­ity of out­sourc­ing ven­dor to com­ply with client’s secu­rity poli­cies, stan­dards, and processes (C1). Any busi­ness process is a for­mal­ized sequence of actions guidedinfor­mally” by the orga­ni­za­tion’s struc­ture and orga­ni­za­tion’s value sys­tem. There is enough evi­dence in the lit­er­a­ture about the impact of process stan­dard­iza­tion on out­sourc­ing suc­cess [Wül­len­we­ber et al. 2008]. How­ever, client orga­ni­za­tion’s con­cern regard­ing the abil­ity of an out­sourc­ing ven­dor to com­ply with the client’s secu­rity poli­cies, stan­dards, and processes, is a cause for con­cern. The con­cern here is indica­tive of the need for facil­i­tat­ing com­mu­ni­ca­tion and coor­di­na­tion required for the align­ment of poli­cies, stan­dards, and processes guid­ing infor­ma­tion secu­rity in an out­sourc­ing engage­ment. Clients cer­tainly place high impor­tance on their poli­cies and processes, giv­ing this con­cern a higher rank. Mean­while, ven­dors view their poli­cies, pro­ce­dures, and stan­dards as being best in class. Clearly, the ven­dors seem to be igno­rant of the fact that hav­ing a process frame­work that is not cus­tomiz­able to the indi­vid­ual require­ments of dif­fer­ent clients can be a poten­tial hin­drance. As one of the client notes:

It is great that an out­sourc­ing ven­dor can claim they are com­pe­tent in pro­vid­ing infor­ma­tion secu­rity but it means noth­ing to the client unless the client per­ceives their spe­cific poli­cies as being effec­tively applied by the ven­dor.

To elim­i­nate the gap, processes and poli­cies need to be com­pre­hen­sive enough and the con­tracts need to empha­size the impli­ca­tions of non-com­pli­ance. For the sake of con­tin­ued alliance, respon­si­bil­ity lies more on the ven­dor to ensure process com­pli­ance and gov­er­nance. Another man­ager from a client orga­ni­za­tion com­mented:

Clients are usu­ally out­sourc­ing to relieve their work­load and per­form­ing a com­pre­hen­sive analy­sis is viewed as adding to the exist­ing work­load they are try­ing to relieve. The more a poten­tial ven­dor is will­ing to be an active part­ner and point out the pros and cons of their own pro­pos­als as well as of the oth­ers, the smaller the gap will be.

Estab­lish­ing con­gru­ence between client and ven­dor secu­rity poli­cies ensures the pro­tec­tion of infor­ma­tion resources and a good work­ing arrange­ment between the client and the ven­dor. Fur­nell and Thom­son [2009] define lev­els of secu­rity com­pli­ance and non­com­pli­ance depend­ing on the degree to which users deem infor­ma­tion secu­rity impor­tant in a par­tic­u­lar con­text. In terms of com­pli­ant behav­ior, there are four cat­e­gories: cul­ture, com­mit­ment, obe­di­ence, and aware­ness. At a cul­tural level, secu­rity becomes an implicit part of user’s behav­ior, whereas, at aware­ness level, users may be aware of the sig­nif­i­cance of secu­rity prac­tice but don’t nec­es­sar­ily com­ply. In terms of non-com­pli­ant behav­ior, there are four cat­e­gories: igno­rance, apa­thy, resis­tance, and dis­obe­di­ence. While an igno­rant user is unaware of secu­rity issues, a dis­obe­di­ent user inten­tion­ally works against secu­rity. As the char­ac­ter­is­tics of out­sourced projects closely con­form to those of a bureau­cratic envi­ron­ment (see, [Weber 1978]), com­pli­ance could become a bureau­cratic process with a lit­tle pas­sion.

Client Con­cern 3: Trust that out­sourc­ing ven­dor will not abuse client’s pro­pri­etary infor­ma­tion and knowl­edge (C26). This con­cern is some­what linked with the other two top most client con­cerns. While over­all trust in insti­tut­ing appro­pri­ate secu­rity con­trols is cer­tainly an issue, the client orga­ni­za­tions are even more con­cerned by los­ing their pro­pri­etary infor­ma­tion. In the realm of the health­care sec­tor, loss of pro­pri­etary infor­ma­tion can have a dev­as­tat­ing effect, par­tic­u­larly because of HIPAA com­pli­ance issues. One of the Com­pli­ance Offi­cers from a med­ical billing firm
noted:

We esti­mate med­ical billing costs to be at about 5% of our total costs. There is a nat­ural ten­dency among small and medium-sized clin­ics to out­source some or all of their med­ical billing. How­ever, there is also a con­stant worry of los­ing con­trol and the pos­si­bil­ity of a breach. Also, once we let go of our own abil­ity to con­trol the data, we also reduce our capa­bil­ity to han­dle such issues in the future.

While there are a few stud­ies that focus on IT out­sourc­ing and capa­bil­ity loss, there is, how­ever, lim­ited research on effects of pro­pri­etary infor­ma­tion loss on the out­sourc­ing rela­tion­ship. Han­d­ley [2012] have hypoth­e­sized that more the capa­bil­ity loss expe­ri­enced by the client firm, the more dif­fi­cult and chal­leng­ing it is to develop a coop­er­a­tive rela­tion­ship with the ven­dor firm. Nev­er­the­less, find­ings from our study lay sig­nif­i­cant impor­tance on loss of data by ven­dors as well as loss of capa­bil­ity by the client firm in their abil­ity to man­age infor­ma­tion secu­rity fol­low­ing IT out­sourc­ing.

5.1.2 Top Three Concerns from a Vendor Perspective

Ven­dor Con­cern 1: Infor­ma­tion secu­rity com­pe­tency of out­sourc­ing ven­dor (C16). Our research found infor­ma­tion secu­rity com­pe­tency of the out­sourc­ing ven­dor as a sig­nif­i­cant con­cern. Many schol­ars have com­mented on the impor­tance of ven­dor com­pe­tence [Goles 2001; Lev­ina and Ross 2003; Will­cocks and Lac­ity 2000]. It is argued that value based out­sourc­ing out­come should be gen­er­ated and trans­ferred from the ven­dor to the client [Lev­ina and Ross 2003]. How­ever, as is indica­tive from our study, clients and ven­dors dif­fer in their opin­ions on infor­ma­tion secu­rity when engag­ing in IT out­sourc­ing. While, ven­dors often believe that prov­ing their com­pe­tency through a large list of cer­ti­fi­ca­tions, awards, and the large clien­tele is impor­tant to have to prove their com­pe­tency, client per­spec­tive is geared towards the appli­ca­tion and uti­liza­tion of ven­dor com­pe­tency. One of the IT man­agers from a bank noted:

The ven­dor is expected to be com­pe­tent in their area of exper­tise, so the client needs to make clear to the ven­dor that a basic expec­ta­tion should not be at the top of their list as there are more impor­tant fac­tors that will be used to dif­fer­en­ti­ate the ven­dors from one another.

As is rightly pointed out by the IT Man­ager, the issue with man­ag­ing com­pe­tence is not to present a base­line of what the ven­dor knows (i.e. the skill set), but a demon­stra­tion of the know-that (see [Dhillon 2008]). Assess­ment of com­pe­tence is out­wardly dri­ven and hence a pre­sen­ta­tion of some matu­rity in secu­rity man­age­ment is essen­tial (e.g. ISO 21827). A com­pe­tence in ensur­ing secu­rity is to develop an abil­ity to define indi­vid­ual know-how and know-that. In the lit­er­a­ture, Infor­ma­tion Secu­rity Com­pe­tence Matu­rity Model is pro­posed to mea­sure the extent of pro­vi­sions for infor­ma­tion secu­rity in an orga­ni­za­tion [Thom­son and von Solms 2006]. Such a model could serve as a bench­mark to assess the com­pe­tence of ven­dors.

Ven­dor Con­cern 2: Com­pre­hen­sive­ness of infor­ma­tion tech­nol­ogy out­sourc­ing deci­sion analy­sis (C5). Our research found that ven­dors expect the client orga­ni­za­tions to have a com­pre­hen­sive approach in their out­sourc­ing efforts. A piece­meal approach tends to leave ven­dors won­der­ing how the out­sourc­ing rela­tion­ship will pro­ceed. Clients, on the other hand, seem to have a dif­fer­ent view. Man­ag­ing con­trol of the data and imple­men­ta­tion of appro­pri­ate con­trols seems to help build trust. One of the man­agers from a ven­dor firm noted:

On many occa­sions, a ven­dor firm is expected to come in and fix thebro­ken” processes. If a bro­ken process is out­sourced, there is a high pos­si­bil­ity of a lot of bit­ter­ness in IT out­sourc­ing. We typ­i­cally encour­age our clients to adopt a com­pre­hen­sive approach when decid­ing to out­source, espe­cially with respect to con­fi­den­tial data.

In the lit­er­a­ture, sim­i­lar con­cerns have been noted. Dun­kle [1996] dis­cusses this aspect in the con­text of out­sourc­ing of a library cat­a­loging process. It is dif­fi­cult to accu­rately pre­dict secu­rity require­ments in an IT out­sourc­ing rela­tion­ship. Hence, some clar­ity in the deci­sion process is required. Sim­i­larly, Goo et al. [2007] found that deci­sion uncer­tainty impacted the dura­tion and qual­ity of the IT out­sourc­ing rela­tion­ship. Our research did not find any stud­ies that focused on infor­ma­tion secu­rity or included secu­rity as an inte­gral com­po­nent of the out­sourc­ing deci­sion analy­sis. How­ever, there clearly seems to be a sen­ti­ment amongst ven­dors that lack of clar­ity and com­pre­hen­sive­ness does have an impact.

Ven­dor Con­cern 3: Dis­si­pa­tion of out­sourc­ing ven­dor’s knowl­edge (C8). While this con­cern seems more crit­i­cal for the clients, there are some sig­nif­i­cant impli­ca­tions for ven­dor firms as well. Ven­dors believe that because of the unto­ward need to com­ply with the whims and fan­cies of the clients, there is usu­ally a dis­si­pa­tion of the knowl­edge over a period. Coun­try Head of a large Indian out­sourc­ing ven­dor noted:

The out­sourc­ing indus­try has a seri­ous prob­lem. While we have our own busi­ness processes, we usu­ally have to recre­ate or recon­fig­ure them based on our client needs and wants. We are usu­ally rather happy to do so. How­ever in the process, we lose our tacit knowl­edge. From our per­spec­tive, it is impor­tant to ensure the pro­tec­tion of this knowl­edge. Many of our secu­rity and pri­vacy con­cerns would be man­aged if we get a lit­tle bet­ter in knowl­edge man­age­ment.

Per­haps Will­cocks et al. [2004] are among the few researchers who have stud­ied the impor­tance of pro­tec­tion of intel­lec­tual prop­erty. Most of the empha­sis has how­ever been on pro­tect­ing loss of intel­lec­tual prop­erty—largely of the client firm. Man­age­ment of knowl­edge to pro­tect tacit knowl­edge has also been stud­ied in the lit­er­a­ture (e.g. see [Arora 1996] and [Nor­man 2002]), though rarely in con­nec­tion with out­sourc­ing.

It goes with­out say­ing that poor knowl­edge man­age­ment struc­tures will dis­ap­point the prospects of procur­ing new con­tracts. In com­par­i­son, the clients seem to either assume that the ven­dor has a sus­tain­able struc­ture that pre­vents or min­i­mizes the loss of intel­lec­tual cap­i­tal and ensures con­fi­den­tial­ity or the client is ready to bear the risk for the per­ceived poten­tial ben­e­fits. Clients expect skilled resources as a con­trac­tual require­ment. As the risk for clients is min­i­mal, they rank this in lesser impor­tance in com­par­i­son to the ven­dors. Exist­ing lit­er­a­ture men­tions, that for the bet­ter man­age­ment of expec­ta­tions, both clients and ven­dors need to under­stand the util­ity of knowl­edge man­age­ment, impli­ca­tions of loss and struc­tural require­ment [Will­cocks et al. 2004]. This is also reflected in the com­ments of one of secu­rity assur­ance man­ager:

Ven­dors need to min­i­mize staff turnover and find ways to ensure staff reten­tion and knowl­edge shar­ing. There are many meth­ods to achieve this; such as bet­ter wages, ben­e­fits, flex time, encour­age­ment, knowl­edge repos­i­to­ries, edu­ca­tion oppor­tu­ni­ties, etc. They should pair vet­eran staff mem­ber with new staff mem­bers to improve their under­stand­ing of con­fi­den­tial­ity, integrity, and avail­abil­ity.

In the lit­er­a­ture, exchange and inter­play of knowl­edge between part­ners are regarded as impor­tant for fos­ter­ing orga­ni­za­tional learn­ing, the absence of which could cause even­tual knowl­edge dis­si­pa­tion [Inkpen and Crossan 1995]. The estab­lish­ment and growth of global out­sourc­ing hinge on the extent to which clients and ven­dors per­ceive a gain from such arrange­ments. To real­ize per­ceived ben­e­fits, schol­ars empha­size on sev­eral strate­gies such as to improve com­mu­ni­ca­tion and coor­di­na­tion processes and to encour­age shar­ing of resources and com­pe­ten­cies among part­ners (see [Chen et al. 2008]). Tacit knowl­edge man­age­ment and ensur­ing the integrity of ven­dor busi­ness processes is a pre­req­ui­site for good and secure out­sourc­ing.

5.2 Research Question 2—What is the extent of (in)congruence amongst the IT outsourcing clients and vendors with respect to the top ranked information security concerns?

The results of our study sug­gest that there are zones of con­gru­ence and incon­gru­ences among clients and ven­dors per­cep­tions of top infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns. We com­pared the rank ordered list of client and ven­dor con­cerns on infor­ma­tion secu­rity in IT out­sourc­ing rela­tion­ships (see Table 4). Informed by Nakatsu and Iacovou [2009], we con­sid­ered the top ten ranked con­cerns of each panel. Seven of the thir­teen con­cerns fall in the zone of con­gru­ence. The results are pre­sented in Fig­ure 2 This means that both the client and ven­dor orga­ni­za­tions agree on at least seven of the infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns. This does not, how­ever, mean that they place equal impor­tance. Client orga­ni­za­tions had three con­cerns that were not regarded by the ven­dors in their top ten list. And ven­dor orga­ni­za­tions had three con­cerns that do not fall within the list of top ten con­cerns of the client orga­ni­za­tions.

Figure 2

Fig­ure 2: Com­par­ing Infor­ma­tion Secu­rity Con­cerns of Clients and Ven­dors

Infor­ma­tion Secu­rity con­cerns that fall in the zone of con­gru­ence are:

C1: Abil­ity of out­sourc­ing ven­dor to com­ply with client’s secu­rity poli­cies, stan­dards, and processes

C5: Com­pre­hen­sive­ness of infor­ma­tion tech­nol­ogy out­sourc­ing deci­sion analy­sis

C8: Dis­si­pa­tion of out­sourc­ing ven­dor’s knowl­edge

C16: Infor­ma­tion secu­rity com­pe­tency of out­sourc­ing ven­dor

C19: Legal and reg­u­la­tory com­pli­ance

C23: Tech­no­log­i­cal matu­rity of out­sourc­ing ven­dor’s envi­ron­ment

C26: Trust that out­sourc­ing ven­dor will not abuse client’s pro­pri­etary infor­ma­tion and knowl­edge

Inter­est­ingly only five of the seven con­cerns from the zone of con­gru­ence are also listed among the top three con­cerns of the clients and ven­dors respec­tively. From a client per­spec­tive, abil­ity of the out­sourc­ing ven­dor to com­ply with client’s secu­rity poli­cies, stan­dards, and processes (C1) and trust that the out­sourc­ing ven­dor applied appro­pri­ate secu­rity con­trols (C26), while being in the zone of con­gru­ence, but these are not among the top three con­cerns for ven­dors. The clients rank con­cerns C1 and C26 as 2 and 3 whereas the ven­dors rank them as 10 and 8 respec­tively. From a ven­dor per­spec­tive, com­pre­hen­sive­ness of infor­ma­tion tech­nol­ogy out­sourc­ing deci­sion analy­sis (C5), Dis­si­pa­tion of out­sourc­ing ven­dor’s knowl­edge (C8), and infor­ma­tion secu­rity com­pe­tency of out­sourc­ing ven­dor (C16) are in the zone of con­gru­ence con­cerns but do not show up among the top three con­cerns for the client orga­ni­za­tions. The clients rank the con­cerns C5, C8, and C16 as 7, 10, and 8 whereas the ven­dors rank these as 2, 3, and 1 respec­tively.

5.3 A Framework to Ensure Information Security in IT Outsourcing

In light of our find­ings, we sum­ma­rize our find­ings by pro­pos­ing a frame­work to ensure infor­ma­tion secu­rity in IT out­sourc­ing (Fig­ure 3). Based on our analy­sis, three major con­structs that emerge are the com­pe­tence of ven­dors; com­pli­ance with poli­cies and reg­u­la­tions; and trust about con­trols and infor­ma­tion pro­tec­tion. Together the three con­structs define infor­ma­tion secu­rity in IT out­sourc­ing. The suc­cess of the frame­work is, how­ever, depen­dent on the level of con­gru­ence between clients and ven­dors with respect to the three con­structs.

Figure 3

Fig­ure 3: A Frame­work to Ensure Infor­ma­tion Secu­rity in IT Out­sourc­ing

There can be sev­eral rea­sons for lack of agree­ment regard­ing the top con­cerns. First, the client and ven­dor orga­ni­za­tions seem to have a dif­fer­ent under­stand­ing of com­pe­tence. As noted pre­vi­ously, ven­dors seem to believe if they have highly skilled staff, then they are com­pe­tent. Clients, on the other hand, seem to sug­gest that the con­cept of com­pe­tence went beyond that of good skills. Per­haps as argued by McGrath et al. [1995] and Dhillon [2008], com­pe­tence in man­ag­ing secu­rity is more about com­pre­hen­sion of the busi­ness processes and knowl­edge of what Weick and Roberts [1993] refers to as know-that. This is an aspect that cer­tainly needs fur­ther inves­ti­ga­tion in future research.

Sec­ond, there seems to be a dif­fer­ent impor­tance placed on aspects of com­pli­ance; may it be com­pli­ance on the preva­lent reg­u­la­tions or with the poli­cies and pro­ce­dures of the client orga­ni­za­tion. It appears to be more of a con­cern regard­ing inter­na­tional out­sourc­ing because of dif­fer­ent reg­u­la­tory cul­tures. Clients seem to sug­gest that com­pli­ance is manda­tory because of reg­u­la­tory aspects in their respec­tive coun­tries. Clients also feel that the ven­dors need to be mind­ful and respect­ful of the con­fi­den­tial data. Ven­dors, on the other hand, rec­og­nize the reg­u­la­tory and com­pli­ance aspects, but cer­tainly do not rank them that high. As Fur­nell and Thom­son [2009] argue, com­pli­ance depends on the degree to which clients and ven­dors regard infor­ma­tion secu­rity impor­tant for IT out­sourc­ing. Fur­ther­more, the impor­tance of com­pli­ance is depen­dent on cul­ture, com­mit­ment, obe­di­ence, and aware­ness. How com­pli­ance varies across var­i­ous IT out­sourc­ing geo­gra­phies is an inter­est­ing research oppor­tu­nity to explore.

Third, the client orga­ni­za­tions seem to grav­i­tate towards the con­cern of trust—trust that the ven­dors are apply­ing appro­pri­ate con­trols; trust that diverse laws and reg­u­la­tions are being respected. Both these con­cerns are crit­i­cal, par­tic­u­larly in light of abuse of con­sumer infor­ma­tion by rogue indi­vid­u­als and those with crim­i­nal intent. Trust is an impor­tant fac­tor for estab­lish­ing con­fi­dence among part­ners. Per­haps a way for­ward to achieve a higher degree of trust is to estab­lish good com­mu­ni­ca­tion and coor­di­na­tion mech­a­nisms between client and ven­dor orga­ni­za­tions [Jar­ven­paa and Lei­d­ner 1999]. The impact of mali­cious or oppor­tunis­tic behav­ior on trust and IT out­sourc­ing presents another research oppor­tu­nity.

5.4 Contributions, Limitations, and Future Research Directions

In this paper, we have sys­tem­at­i­cally iden­ti­fied infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns that clients and ven­dors con­sider impor­tant in IT out­sourc­ing rela­tion­ships. To the best of our knowl­edge, this is per­haps one of the few stud­ies that explic­itly ana­lyzes infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns in the con­text of IT out­sourc­ing. The empir­i­caly grounded study allows us to the­o­rize about infor­ma­tion secu­rity in IT out­sourc­ing. Method­olog­i­cally the unique com­bi­na­tion of an estab­lished Del­phi tech­nique with in-depth inter­views allows us to develop unique insights into the sub­ject mat­ter. Our con­cep­tu­al­iza­tion of the con­cerns (Fig­ure 3) does not nec­es­sar­ily focus on the zone of con­gru­ence or incon­gru­ence. Rather we develop insights based on the top con­cerns of clients and ven­dors and the con­gru­ent and incon­gru­ent con­cerns. The holis­tic per­spec­tive allows us to iden­tify com­pe­tence, com­pli­ance, and trust as cen­tral con­cepts to ensure infor­ma­tion secu­rity in IT out­sourc­ing.

Our study has impor­tant impli­ca­tions for prac­ti­tion­ers. First, the list of 26 infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns iden­ti­fied by the experts pro­vides IT man­agers with a com­pre­hen­sive list that can be used to develop infor­ma­tion secu­rity plan­ning guide­lines for IT out­sourc­ing projects. This list has the merit of being com­pre­hen­sive as it was derived by expe­ri­enced pan­elists who are involved in global IT out­sourc­ing projects. Sec­ond, our study pro­vides insights about the lack of con­gru­ence between clients and ven­dors as one of the major risks in IT out­sourc­ing. The find­ings from our study can help client and ven­dor man­agers iden­tify and assess risks aris­ing due to the incon­gru­ence between the client and ven­dor orga­ni­za­tions, and strate­gize for the pre­ven­tion and cor­rec­tion of any poten­tial infor­ma­tion secu­rity dis­rup­tion.

The study is not with­out its lim­i­ta­tions. We inherit the method­olog­i­cal lim­i­ta­tions of the Del­phi tech­nique. When under­tak­ing a Del­phi study, con­sid­er­able effort is required to get buy-in from the experts. It was very time con­sum­ing to iden­tify client and ven­dor orga­ni­za­tions and then get an agree­ment from the par­tic­i­pants to be involved in the study. Fur­ther­more, the fol­low-up inter­views were con­ducted with the US based client and ven­dor
firms. As a con­se­quence, one might ques­tion the rep­re­sen­ta­tive­ness of our experts. Our study also just focused on rela­tion­ships between the US and India-based firms. It will be use­ful to extend the study to other con­texts. While our research con­cludes by pos­tu­lat­ing cer­tain rela­tion­ships between com­pe­tence, com­pli­ance, and trust, there is cer­tainly a need to fur­ther
test the model empir­i­cally.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, we have pre­sented an in-depth study of infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns in an IT out­sourc­ing arrange­ment. We argued that while sev­eral schol­ars have stud­ied the rel­a­tive suc­cess and fail­ure of IT out­sourc­ing, the emer­gent secu­rity con­cerns have not been addressed ade­quately. Con­sid­er­ing this gap in the lit­er­a­ture, we con­ducted a Del­phi study to iden­tify the top infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns in IT out­sourc­ing from both clients and ven­dors per­spec­tives. Finally, we engaged in qual­i­ta­tive inter­views to under­stand the in(con­gru­ence) between clients and ven­dors on the infor­ma­tion secu­rity con­cerns. This in-depth analy­sis leads us to pro­pose a frame­work to ensure infor­ma­tion secu­rity in IT out­sourc­ing. While we believe there should be a pos­i­tive cor­re­la­tion amongst the pro­posed con­structs, clearly fur­ther research is nec­es­sary in this regard.

Infor­ma­tion secu­rity in IT out­sourc­ing is an impor­tant aspi­ra­tion for orga­ni­za­tions to pur­sue. There is no doubt that many busi­nesses thrive on get­ting part of their oper­a­tions taken care of by a ven­dor. It not only makes busi­ness sense to do so, but it also allows enter­prises to tap into the exper­tise that may reside else­where. Secu­rity then is sim­ply a means to ensure a smooth run­ning of the busi­ness. The def­i­n­i­tion of the per­ti­nent con­cerns and the means to estab­lish con­gruity allows us to strate­gi­cally plan secure IT out­sourc­ing.

Appendix A

Table A1: Evo­lu­tion of Ranks Over Rounds: Ven­dors View of Con­cerns

Table A1

Table A2: Evo­lu­tion of Ranks Over Rounds: Clients View of Con­cerns

Table A2

References